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Torts-Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of
Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee
I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of defining a landowner's' responsibility toward persons who come upon his premises has been the subject of longstanding
constroversy.2 While some commentators have argued that the limited
responsibility placed by the common law on landowners does not comport with modern principles of negligence liability 3 proponents of the
common-law standards have urged that the common-law scheme of
entrant classes-trespasser, licensee, invitee-provides a workable approach to the determination of landowners' liability to entrants.4 This
Comment will explore the origin, evolution, and refinement of the
common-law classifications, with particular focus upon recent decisions

abrogating these distinctions in favor of a broader standard of ordinary
care under the circumstances.
II.

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON-LAW CLASSES

The judicial practice of limiting a landowner's liability by classifying those who enter his land as trespassers, licensees, or invitees evolved
from the feudal concept "that the owner was sovereign within his own

boundaries and as such might do what he pleased on or with his own
domain." ' 5 This privileged status of the landowner was well accepted by
the common-law courts during the middle years of the nineteenth cen-

tury, when the scheme of entrant classes was first propounded, but
general principles of tort liability 6 were not then well recognized by the
I. The terms "landowner," "land occupier," and "land possessor" each have independent
significance in many contexts. Nevertheless, the terms are employed interchangeably for the purposes of this Comment to refer to the individual who would be,answerable to a tort action brought
by an entrant injured on the premises.
2. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 58, at 357 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
3. See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 YALE L.J.
633 (1959); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69
L.Q. REV. 182 (1953); McDonald & Leigh, The Law of Occupiers' Liability and the Need for
Reform in Canada, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 55 (1965); Note, 70 L.Q. REV. 33 (1954); Note, 19
MODERN L. REv. 691 (1956); Note, 17 MODERN L. REV. 265 (1954); Note, 35 N.Z.L.J. 113 (1959).
4. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105
(1968) (Burke, J., dissenting); Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. REV. 359
(1958).

5.

F.

BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS

163 (1926).

6. Bohlen described the negligence principles that eventually emerged as follows: "the
general principle of tort law, which makes anyone liable for any injury which he does to any
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courts or often invoked in controversies involving landowner liability.7
Although the nineteenth century judges were cognizant of the threat to

community safety that unlimited landowner immunity would represent,
they proceeded very cautiously with respect to any extension of landowner liability in favor of visitors.8 Consequently, judges were reluctant to leave the determination of occupier liability to the verdict of a

jury composed mainly of potential land entrants.9 In order to circumscribe the scope of the jury's discretion to find landowner liability, the

courts devised various categories of land entrants," toward whom different standards of conduct were demanded of the landowner." When
general principles of negligence liability obtained wider legal acceptance, a development prompted by the onset of the Industrial Revolution
and the consequently increased incidence of industrial accidents, 2 the
common-law courts superimposed the new principles upon the existing
framework of entrant categories.13 The result was a limitation of the

landowner's liability in terms of the negligence requirement of a duty
of care,'4 under which the scope of the landowner's duty rested entirely
upon the category to which the individual entrant belonged. Therefore,
even after the principles of negligence liability had gained prominence,
member of a determinate class by any act which he should realise will create an undue risk of injury
...
Id. at 181.
to persons of that class.
7. Marsh, supra note 3, at 184. The predisposition of common-law courts toward the preservation of landowner immunity is exemplified by Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex.
1856), a case in which the court held that a hotelkeeper was not liable to an invited visitor who
was injured by a glass fragment that had fallen from the hotel's glass door. The court concluded
that, during his presence in the hotel, the visitor had to take his chances along with the other
members of the establishment.156 Eng. Rep. at 1197.
8. Marsh, supra note 3, at 185.
9. Id. This approach is exemplified in Toomey v. London B. & S.C. Ry., 140 Eng. Rep.
694 (C.P. 1857), in which the judge asserted that a finding of liability would have been forthcoming
had the matter of the railroad's liability been submitted to the jury. 140 Eng. Rep. at 696.
10. Marsh, supra note 3, at 186.
11. Id. In addition to the particular attention to the function of the jury, the 19th century
judges relied extensively upon existing legal concepts to deal with the problems of landowner
liability. The concepts relied upon included: nuisance on the highways, influence of the contractual
analogy for those entering by virtue of a contract, conduct in the nature of fraud, and distinctions
between wrongs of commission and wrongs of omission. Id. at 186-98.
12. See 13 ST.Louis U.L.J. 449, 450-51 (1969). It was not until 1883 that the first attempt
was made to state a formula of duty. In Heaven v. Pender, II Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883), the court
stated: "Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another
that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognise that if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill
to avoid such danger." A more precise formulation appears in the opinion of Lord Esher in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580.
13. 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449, 450-51 (1969).
14. Id.
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the common law largely retained the nineteenth century concept of

landowner immunity, tempered only by the developing judicial inclination to protect public safety through the rigidly defined 5 classifications
of landowner duty.
The leading cases 6 establishing the three classes of visitors were not

decided until 1865 and 1866. The courts in England and the United
States, however, quickly adopted the classifications, specifying the standard of care owed to members of each class. These classifications, with

their separate standards of landowner duty, have continued as the common law until today. The least protected class, that of trespassers,

comprises those who enter the land of another without license or any
form of permission. 7 The only limitation upon the landowner's basic
lack of duty toward trespassers is that he must refrain from wilfully or
wantonly injuring trespassers who enter the premises.' 8 The most per-

plexing of the common-law entrant classes, that of licensees, consists of
entrants who receive the landowner's "bare"'" permission to enter the

premises for the entrant's own purposes.20 The obligation of the land15. See Robert Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 371 (line that separates the
classes is absolutely rigid, with no no-man's land between the adjacent classes).
16. See Sweeney v. Old Colony & N.R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865) (the leading case
and bellwether of the common-law classification scheme in American jurisdictions); Indemaur v.
Dames, 14 L.T.R. (n.s.) 484 (C.P. 1866), qaf'd, 16 L.T.R. (n.s.) 293 (Ex. 1867) (the court gave, as
an example of invitee status, the situation of a customer at a shop who was there on a matter in
which both plaintiff and defendant had an interest).
17. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 27.3, at 1435 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER
& JAMES]; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 58, at 357.
18. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 58, at 362. Several justifications are asserted for the minimal
duty of protection owed by landowners to trespassers, including the following: occupiers are not
likely to expect trespassers on their land, therefore a more stringent standard of care would impose
unreasonable burdens on the use of the land; the trespasser is a wrongdoer who deserves little or
no protection; and the trespasser assumes the risk of injury when he ventures onto the premises of
another. On this final point see Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV.
108 (196 1). Both James and Prosser refute these asserted justifications in their respective treatises.
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 17, § 27.3, at 1436-40; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 58, at 366-68.
The land possessor is not liable to trespassers for injury caused by his failure to exercise reasonable
care in making his premises safe for trespassers or his failure to conduct his activities in such a
manner as not to endanger trespassers. See. e.g., Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Mathis, 349
F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1965); Langford v. Mercurio, 254 Miss. 788, 183 So. 2d 150 (1966); Beauchamp
v. New York City Housing Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 400, 190 N.E.2d 412, 240 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1963);
Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965); Nalepinski v. Durner, 259
Wis. 583, 49 N.W.2d 601 (1951).
19. The licensee is often termed a "bare," "naked," or "mere" licensee, indicating that the
smallest measure of license is sufficient for inclusion within the classification. 2 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 17, § 27.8, at 1470.
20. The fact that the licensee enters for his own purposes, or those of his principal, is a
primary factor that distinguishes licensees from invitees. When the entrant comes on the landowner's premises for the landowner's own purposes, the entrant is often given invitee status.
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owner toward licensees upon his land is not significantly different from
that owed to trespassers, except when the landowner learns of a danger-

ous condition and should realize that it poses an unreasonable danger
to licensees and also should reasonably expect that the condition is
unknown to the licensee. Under those circumstances, although no duty
to a trespasser would arise, the landowner must take action to avoid
injury to the licensee.2 ' The landowner is, however, under no duty to

inspect the premises to discover dangers unknown to him or to warn the
licensee of conditions that are or should be known to the licensee himself.22 The third common-law entrant class, that of invitees, is composed
of those who enter the premises of another upon the occupier's express

or implied invitation for a business purpose that concerns the landowner. 23 The landowner has an affirmative duty to inspect his prem-

ises and to make them safe for the reception of invitees; 4 he must warn
the invitee of any concealed danger or take action to render the condi-

tion safe; s but he has no duty to warn invitees of dangers that are as
obvious to the entrant as to the occupier.2 A significant aspect of the
invitee category is the existence of two tests for the determination of an
entrant's invitee status, the business visitor rule 7 and the public invita21. See Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951). Some cases still hold that
the landowner owes the licensee no duty beyond that of refraining from wilfully or wantonly
injuring him. See, e.g., Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236 (1951); Maxwell v.
Maxwell, 140 Mont. 59, 367 P.2d 308 (1961); Walker v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 195, 384 S.W.2d
447 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236 (1951); Brauner v.
Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 169 S.W.2d 4 (1943); Myszkiewicz v. Lord Baltimore Filling Station, 168 Md.
642, 178 A. 356 (1935).
23. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 61, at 385. See, e.g., Holmes v. Ginter Restaurant Co., 54 F.2d
876 (1st Cir. 1932) (restaurant); Knapp v. Connecticut Theatrical Corp., 122 Conn. 413, 190 A.
291 (1937) (theater); Sinn v. Farmer's Deposit Say. Bank, 330 Pa. 85, 150 A. 163 (1930) (bank);
Royer v. Najarian, 60 R.I. 368, 198 A. 562 (1938) (store).
24. See, e.g., Harry Poretsky & Sons, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 235 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1956); Garrett
v. National Tea Co., 12 I11.2d 567, 147 N.E.2d 367 (1958); Graham v. Loper Elec. Co., 192 Kan.
558, 389 P.2d 750 (1964); Mackey v. Allen, 369 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1965); Benjamin v. O'Connell &
Lee Mfg. Co., 334 Mass. 646, 138 N.E.2d 126 (1956); Bonniwell v. St. Paul Union Stockyards
Co., 271 Minn. 233, 135 N.W.2d 499 (1965).
25. See, e.g., Straight v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 47 A.2d 605 (1946).
26. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 99 N.W.2d 310 (1959); Del Sesto v. Condakes, 341 Mass. 146, 167 N.E.2d 635 (1960); Wilkins v. Allied Stores, 308 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.
1958).
27. The business visitor rule is often referred to as the economic benefit rule. The rule has
been applied to a wide variety of situations. See, e.g., Downing v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 192 Iowa
1250, 184 N.W. 722 (1921) (patrons in a bank); Kurre v. Graham Ship by Truck Co., 136 Kan.
356, 15 P.2d 463 (1932) (driver calling for goods); Huber v. American Drug Stores, 19 La. App.
430, 140 So. 120 (1932) (customer in a store); Brown v. Rhoades, 126 Me. 186, 137 A. 58 (1927)
(patron of an amusement park); Smith v. Cumberland County Agricultural Soc'y, 163 N.C. 346,
79 S.E. 632 (1913) (patron at county fair); Coston v. Skyland Hotel, 231 N.C. 546, 57 S.E.2d 793
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tion test. 28 The former rule stresses the pecuniary benefit conferred upon

the landowner by virtue of the entrant's visit; the latter test is premised
upon the entrant's reliance on the landowner's implied declaration that
the premises are safe for the purpose that the entrant is pursuing.

The harsh, often unjust results of applying the rigid common-law
classifications29 and a feeling that the importance of human safety often
transcends that of the landowner's freedom 3 to make use of his land
have engendered numerous exceptions to the original common-law classifications. The nominal duty owed by landowners to trespassers upon

the premises has been enlarged by the judicial creation of several explicit
subclasses and exceptions that contemplate a higher standard of landowner care, namely: frequent trespassers on a limited area of the premises,3 1 dangerous activities on the premises,32 child trespassers, 33 and
(1950) (patron in a hotel); Maehlman v. Reuben Realty Co., 32 Ohio App. 54, 166 N.E. 920 (1928)
(patron of a bathing beach); Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 A. 568 (1926) (patron of a
theater). See also James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and
Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573
(1942).
28. The public invitation test is now widely accepted and has been applied to many factual
settings. See, e.g., Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942) (plaintiff attending
college reunion); Blakely v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N.W. 482 (1908) (spectator at
public place of amusement who paid no admission fee); Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal
Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463 (1928) (plaintiff attending church service); Abbott v. New
York Pub. Library, 263 App. Div. 314, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1942) (public library patron). See also
Marsh, supra note 3; Prosser, supra note 27.
29. E.g., Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, 21 N.E. 369 (1889). Plaintiff, a licensee,
fell into a hole on defendant's land that extended into an 8 foot strip of land across which plaintiff
had to walk to pass between two houses. The court held that a person goes onto the land of another
at his own risk and must accept the premises as he finds them. The Reardon court expressed the
view that an open hole not otherwise concealed than by darkness is a danger that plaintiff must
accept.
30. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 58, at 360. Prosser describes defendant's interest in unrestricted
use of his land as no more than his desire to be free from all burden of trouble and expense in
taking precautions for the protection of land entrants. Id.
31. When to the knowledge of the land occupier, trespassers habitually enter a small portion
of the premises, the burden of looking out for the entrant;is reduced and the risk of harm is
increased. The landowner is therefore under a duty of reasonable care to discover and protect the
trespassers. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 58, at 360-61. This revised duty toward frequent, known
trespassers reflects the reliance of the courts on fictions that were intended to ameliorate the
shocking practical consequences of strict application of the traditional classifications when the
probability of harm from defendant's conduct is foreseeably great. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note
17, § 27.7, at 1467. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); Denver &
R.G.W.R.R. v. Clint, 235 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1956); Palmer v. Gordon, 173 Mass. 410, 53 N.E.
909 (1899); Cheslock v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 157, 69 A.2d 108 (1949); Carter v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 114 S.C. 517, 104 S.E. 186 (1920).
32. Liability is imposed regardless of plaintiff's status when the negligent conduct consists
of active operations on the premises. See, e.g., De Haven v. Hennessey Bros. & Evans Co., 137 F.
472 (6th Cir. 1905) (operating machinery); Bylling v. Edwards, 193 Cal. App. 2d 736, 14 Cal. Rptr.
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the presence of "traps" or concealed dangers that are not likely to be
perceived by the trespasser. 34 Mitigating exceptions have also arisen

expanding the standard of care imposed for the protection of licensees, 35 but a more significant factor ameliorating the impact of the rigid
common-law rules defining licensees is the flexibility with which the
courts have construed and applied the competing tests for the determination of invitee status. By exercising their discretion to interpret the
two tests expansively, the courts occasionally have stretched the bounds
of invitee status to include some plaintiffs who otherwise would have
been licensees. 36 The Restatement (Second) of Torts has adopted the
760 (1961); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Blevins, 293 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1956) (running train); Lordi v.
Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581, 45 A.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (shutting off gas); Brigman v. Fisk-Carter
Constr. Co., 192 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 125 (1926) (backing up a truck); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d
777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963) (swinging a golf club).
33. A new basis of liability to trespassing children rests upon the foreseeability of harm to
the child. This theory evolved from the now discredited "attractive nuisance" rationale enunciated
in Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873). 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 17, § 27.5, at 1447-61. See also Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L.
REV. I 11, 120 (1924); Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 50 (1937).
34. When a condition is highly dangerous and is not likely to be perceived by trespassers
and when it is known that trespassers are likely to be exposed to the risk, a duty of care to protect
against such risk is sometimes imposed. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 27.3, at 1443. See Corby v. Hill,
140 Eng. Rep. 1209 (C.B. 1858). A special exception has been developed by the courts of New
Jersey called the dangerous instrumentality rule. The rule first appeared in Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 A. 472 (Sup. Ct. 1890). In that case, plaintiff was
not a trespasser, but rather a neighbor of the landowner. The landowner had installed the boiler
on his premises and plaintiff was injured when the boiler exploded, sending fragments onto plaintiff's land. The court concluded that to the extent that the object employed endangers others, or is
being used for private benefit, the proprietor should exercise a high degree of care. The New Jersey
courts have expanded the Van Winkle rule to other contexts, including landowner liability. For a
complete discussion of the impact of the dangerous instrumentality rule on the liability of landowners to trespassers see 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 599 (1958). Because the common-law limitations on
landowner liability do not apply to persons not on the landowner's premises, some courts have
treated the visitor or entrant as though he were off the premises when he was really on them. See,
e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Anderson, 39 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1930) (liability for excavations near
highway); Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217 (1879) (plaintiff, while walking along a public sidewalk,
sat down on defendant's doorstep to tie his shoe, and was allowed to recover when a brick fell on
him from above); Barnes v. Ward, 137 Eng. Rep. 945 (C.B. 1850).
35. As to any active operations which the occupier conducts, there exists an obligation to
exercise reasonable care for the protection of a licensee. See note 32 supra; PROSSER, supra note
2, § 60, at 379. The exception imposes a higher standard of care for the protection of licensees,
however, than is imposed in favor of trespassers, because the possessor may be required to look
out for licensees before their presence is discovered. Id. at 380. See, e.g., Anderson v. Welty, 334
S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1960); White v. Burkeybile, 386 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Slobodzian
v. Beighley, 401 Pa. 520, 164 A.2d 923 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341 (1964).
36. The business visitor rule has been rather ingeniously applied in many instances to those
who confer at best a very tenuous economic benefit. See, e.g., Hickey v. Shoemaker, 132 Ind. App.
136, 167 N.E.2d 487 (1960) (plaintiff entered funeral home to view body); Pope v. Willow Garages,
274 Mass. 440, 174 N.E. 727 (1930) (guest accompanied driver to automobile garage); Powell v.
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basic common-law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee,
subject to many of the judicially developed exceptions and modifica3
tions. 1

III.

THE MOVEMENT TOWARD ABROGATION OF THE COMMON-LAW
3
CLASSES: ROWLAND V. CHRISTIAN 1

While most jurisdictions have adopted many of the various exceptions to the common-law entrant classes, few have abrogated the classes
entirely. The legal distinctions between licensees and invitees were abolished by statute in England. 9 To date, however, only one United States
jurisdiction 0 has followed the English legislative lead." On the judicial
side, as early as 1952, the Missouri Supreme Court expressed its view

that "the status of the injured party does not necessarily control under
all circumstances. ' 4 2 In a later case, Wolfson v. Chelist, 3 the same
court found that the traditional entrant-occupier relationship must yield
to sound humanitarian considerations as the primary determinant of the
occupier's liability when economic and social conditions so warrant.4
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington, in Potts v. Amis,45 manifested its willingness to accept a rule of reasonable conduct under the
circumstances as determinative of the landowner's liability, but declined
Great Lakes Transit Corp., 152 Minn. 90, 188 N.W. 61 (1922) (plaintiff was present in railway
station to see passenger off); Nary v. Parking Authority, 58 N.J. Super. 222, 156 A.2d 42 (1959)
(guest accompanied driver to parking lot); Wingrove v. Home Land Co., 120 W. Va. 100, 196 S.E.
563 (1938) (guest accompanied driver to automobile filling station).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328E-50 (1964).
38. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
39. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957). The statute has been criticized for
leaving unresolved questions of the degree of control by the occupier necessary to impose liability
on him, the sufficiency of a warning to discharge the landowner's duty of reasonable care, and the
effect of the entrant's contributory negligence. See Odgers, Occupiers' Liability: A Further
Comment, 1957 CAMB. L.J. 39; Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. REV. 359
(1958).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-557a (Supp. 1969). A; similar abrogation of the commonlaw distinctions between licensees and invitees apparently was effected judicially in Louisiana in
Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1957). See
44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426 (1969).
41. The English and Connecticut statutes are silent regarding the status of trespassers. This
omission presumably means that the common-law classification scheme has been retained with
respect to trespassers. See 14 VILL. L. REV. 360 (1969).
42. Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Mo. 1952).
43. 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955).
44. Id. at 451.
45. 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963). The court in Potts referred to Sherman v. Seattle,
57 Wash. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960), a case in which the rule of foreseeability of harm was applied
when a child was injured at a dam site owned by the city. The Sherman court concluded that the
child's technical entrant status was not controlling.
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to decide whether or not the common-law classes should be disregarded.46 Decisions in two earlier New Jersey cases47 provide more defi-

nite indications of a judicial inclination to reject completely the
common-law classification rules. Each concluded that the trend or tend-

ency was to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances upon landowners rather than permitting them to seek immunity
under the rigid common-law doctrine. The New Jersey decisions, how-

ever, did not expressly abrogate the common-law classes in that jurisdiction.4 8
In a 1968 decision, Rowland v. Christian,49 the California Supreme
Court became the first among United States courts to repudiate the
common-law classifications as conclusive determinants of landowner
liability to entrants. 0 In Rowland the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a cracked water faucet in defendant's bathroom

broke in his hand. 5' The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment, finding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover
because, as a licensee, plaintiff was required to take the premises as he
found them. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
common-law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee were no

longer determinative of the landowner's liability and that a standard of
ordinary care under the circumstances was thenceforth to be imposed

upon landowners.52 The court in Rowland rested its decision primarily
46. 62 Wash. 2d at 787, 384 P.2d at 831.
47. In Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956), the court
concluded that when there is foreseeability of substantial harm, landowners should be subjected to
a reasonable duty of care to avoid it. Id. at 462, 126 A.2d at 317. Similarly, in Simmel v. New
Jersey Coop. Co., 47 N.J. Super. 509, 136 A.2d 301 (App. Div.), rev'd on othergrounds, 28 N.J.
1, 143 A.2d 521 (1957), the court indicated that the tendency to impose a broad standard of
reasonable conduct upon landowners reflected a view even more attuned to revision of the commonlaw scheme than the then-Restatement position. 47 N.J. Super. at 513, 136 A.2d at 303.
48. Although Taylor and Simmel appeared to establish a new rule for New Jersey, the point
is open to question in light of a later decision in that state. In Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J.
303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959), the court rejected an argument that the landowner's duty to one lawfully
on the premises was the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances.
49. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
50. Nevertheless, the court in Rowland did conclude that the entrant's status had a bearing
on the ultimate question of liability as a circumstance to be weighed by the jury in assessing the
landowner's conduct.
51. Defendant was a tenant in an apartment building. She was aware of the defect because
she had attempted to have her landlord repair the faucet before plaintiff sought to use the bathroom. 69 Cal. 2d at 110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
52. The court formulated its view of the proper test as follows: "Whether in the management
of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others,
and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in light of facts giving
rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative."
69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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upon three bases. First, relying upon a longstanding provision of the
California Civil Code 3 that uniformly imposes liability upon every
person whose lack of ordinary care results in injury to another, the court
found that the basic state policy expressed in the statute does not sanction the sort of sweeping departure from the ordinary care standard that
the common-law classes represent.54 Secondly, the court suggested that,
whatever the historical justifications for the common-law classifications, such distinctions are unjustifiable in a modern society because
they are no longer supported by public policy.5 5 Lastly, the court concluded that the common-law classes and their various exceptions do not
reflect the major factors that should determine whether immunity ought
to be conferred upon a possessor of land.56
The existence of the California statutory requirement of ordinary
care or skill, 57 and the court's reliance upon that statute in Rowland,
introduced uncertainty regarding the extent to which the rule enunciated
by the court established a new common-law duty for landowners and
possessors. That the common-law classifications and the statute coexisted for decades in California, however, supports arguments that emphasize the broader policy rationale of Rowland almost to the exclusion
58
of the narrower statutory ground.
In cases decided subsequent to Rowland the California courts have
exhibited general approval and acceptance of the new rule of ordinary
53. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1954) provides: "Every one is responsible, not only for
the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary
care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
The code section had been in
force for approximately 96 years when Rowland was decided.
54. 69 Cal. 2d at 118-19, 43 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
55. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
56. The court listed the factors that it considered relevant in the determination of whether
immunity should be conferred: (1) the closeness of the connection between the injury and the
defendant's conduct; (2) the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct; (3) the policy of preventing future harm; and (4) the prevalence and availability of insurance to protect the landowner. Id.
Although the court in Rowland acknowledged that it might have attained the same result by
carving further exceptions from the traditional common-law rules, it asserted that such a course
would serve merely to multiply the confusion and inconsistency already associated with the
common-law classification scheme. Id.at 119-20, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105. In his
dissenting opinion to Rowland, Justice Burke argued that the common-law classifications had
provided a "reasonable and workable approach" to the determination of landowner liability to
entrants. Burke's opinion emphasized that courts should exercise judicial restraint and defer to the
action of the legislature when contemplating sweeping modifications of the common law.
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1954).
58. See Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12, rehearingdenied, 45 Cal. 2d 208,
289 P.2d 242 (1955) (the court held that the language of the code should be construed as a
reformulation of the common law rather than as a new statutory enactment of the general duty of
care); 44 N.Y. U.L. REv. 426, 432 (1969).
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care under the circumstances. 59 Outside California, the rule of Rowland

0
was adopted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Pickard v. Honolulu."
In a short opinion, the court merely expressed its view that the common-

law classifications bore no relationship to the issue of reasonable care.6
Pickard is significant because the decision resolves the question of

whether a statutory standard of care, such as that present in Rowland,
is a prerequisite to judicial abrogation of the common-law classes. There

was no such statute in force in Hawaii when Pickardwas decided. While
by 1971 California and Hawaii were the only jurisdictions to have abro-

gated the common-law classifications, many other jurisdictions had by
then reexamined their rules of landowner liability and had expressed
dissatisfaction with continued reliance on the common-law scheme of
entrant classes.
63

IV.

MILE HIGH FENCE CO. v. RADOVICH

Colorado became the third jurisdiction to abrogate judicially the

common-law classification scheme when the Colorado Supreme Court
adopted the rule of Rowland v. Christian in Mile High Fence Co. v.
59. See, e.g., Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc., 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1970); Beard
v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1970); Fitch v. LeBeau, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 320, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1960); Carlson v. Ross, 271 Cal. App. 2d 29, 76 Cal. Rptr. 209
(1969); Mezerkor v. Texaco, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 76, 72 Cal. Rptr. 1, rehearingdenied, 266 Cal.
App. 2d 105, 72 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1968); Holliday v. Miles, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 396, 72 Cal. Rptr.
96 (1968). But see Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914
(1969). In Beauchamp, the court of appeals purported to limit the scope of the Rowland rule to
an abrogation of the common-law standard as to licensees only, thereby renewing the importance
of decisions declaring the substantive duties of the landowner toward invitees. The California
Supreme Court has not yet discussed the effect of Beauchamp upon its decision in Rowland.
60. 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969).
61. Pickard was followed in Gibo v. Honolulu, 459 P.2d 198 (Hawaii 1969), a case holding
that the entrant's status was not significant on the question of whether his presence was to be
anticipated by the landowner.
62. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959), in
which the Court refused to apply the common-law classification rules to controversies arising under
admiralty law. The Court characterized the distinctions between licensees and invitees as constituting nothing more useful than a "semantic morass." In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 26567 (1960), the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to import the common-law classifications
into the law of search and seizure. See also Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.W.2d 484 (Ky.
1968) (whether children classified as trespassers, invitees, or licensees not controlling determinant
of landowner's liability); Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d
730 (La. App. 1957) (dictum); Di Gildo v. Caponi, 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969)
(question of whether to adopt the rule of Rowland left unresolved); Kinney v. Sun Oil Co., 437
Pa. 80, 262 A.2d 128, 132 n.4 (1970) (dissenting opinion doubted the value of the common-law
distinctions in the context of determining the rights of public employees injured on defendant's
premises).
63. 489 P.2d 308 (Colo.1971).
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Radovich. Plaintiff" sought damages for injuries sustained when he
stepped into an unguarded posthole that had been dug by defendant
contractor. 5 The trial court" rendered judgment for plaintiff and

awarded damages for his injuries, concluding that defendant had been
negligent in creating a hazardous condition that proximately caused
plaintiff's injuries. Defendant brought an appeal in which he contended
that plaintiff was a mere licensee when he entered the premises and that
defendant therefore owed plaintiff no duty of protection. In affirming

the trial court's findings, the court of appeals 7 concluded that the entrant's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee was no longer controlling as a determinant of the landowner's duty of care. 8 The Colorado

Supreme Court affirmed both lower court determinations, thereby abolishing the conclusive effect of the common-law classifications and sub-

stituting a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.
The Colorado court relied primarily upon policy arguments to sup-

port its rejection of the common-law classifications. The court cited
cases illustrating the sort of judicial waste often produced by the application of the common-law classification rules.6" Secondly, the court
reasoned that because rigid adherence to the common-law distinctions
had often resulted in resolution of the landowner's liability as a matter
of law, Colorado juries to that extent had been effectively prevented
from performing their fact-finding function and from applying contemporary community standards to the conduct of landowners. 0 The court
cited further examples to demonstrate that determinations of landowner
liability without benefit of jury often had subjected land entrants with
meritorious claims to unduly harsh treatment. 71 The final ground of64. Plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while maintaining surveillance of a known prostitute and her apparent customer.
65. Defendant had failed to install warning lights, barricades, or other protective devices to
guard the perimeter of the hole.
66. The suit was tried to the court without a jury.
67. 28 Colo. App. 400, 474 P.2d 796 (1970). The court of appeals relied principally upon an
earlier Colorado decision suggesting that a general standard of care should be substituted for the
common-law classifications. See Kenney v. Grice, 171 Colo. 185, 465 P.2d 401 (1970).
68. 28 Colo. App. at 401, 474 P.2d at 799.
69. The principal example was Smith v. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co., 78 Colo. 169, 240
P. 332 (1925), a case that was before the Colorado Supreme Court on four occasions without
satisfactory application of the common-law distinctions. Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489
P.2d at 312,
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision Co., 93 Colo. 276, 25 P.2d 719 (1933)
(plaintiff, whose wife walked into unguarded elevator shaft while delivering lunch to son, was
denied recovery because wife was classified as a trespasser or a "mere" licensee); Lunt v. Post
Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 P. 203 (1910) (fireman a licensee because under a
public duty to extinguish the fire; accordingly he took the premises as he found them).
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fered by the court in support of its rejection of the common-law classifications was that, although there is an apparent incompatibility between
the position adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding

landowner liability and the rule of Rowland v. Christian, in actuality
there is no inconsistency. 72 The court concluded that the basic theme
emphasized repeatedly by the Restatement is that the entrant status of
licensee or invitee is not the controlling determinant of landowner liabil73
ity.
The reconciliation of the Restatement with Rowland by the court
in Radovich was the product of questionable reasoning. Alluding to the
relevant provisions of the Restatement that establish three explicit standards of care toward trespassers, licensees, and invitees, the court reasoned that, under circumstances satisfying the conditions of landowner
liability to licensees set out in section 342,'7 the Restatement would
impose liability regardless of whether the entrant were a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee. 75 The conclusion is essentially correct in relation to

licensees and invitees; it is correct in relation to trespassers only if
further conditions are met.76 From this particular conclusion the court
inferred generally that entrant class status is not of controlling significance for any determination of liability under the Restatement formulation. 7 However, this generalization is readily refuted. According to
Restatement section 343, which imposes far greater duties upon lan-

downers for the protection of invitees in relation to dangerous condi72. 489 P.2d at 314.
73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1964), provides: "A possessor of land is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or
realize the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to
warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and (c) the licensees do not know or have
reason to know of the condition and the risk involved."
75. 489 P.2d at 314.
76. Of course, if the landowner is liable to a licensee under the conditions of § 342, it
necessarily follows that he would be liable to invitees under the same circumstances, for § 343
imposes an even higher standard of care than § 342. For liability to be imposed in favor of
trespassers in circumstances meeting the conditions of § 342, however, several additional conditions must be met. First, if the trespasser qualifies as a frequent trespasser on a limited area
under § 335, then the condition must be an artificial one, must be likely, to the occupier's knowledge, to cause death or serious bodily injury to frequent trespassers, and must be of such nature
that the occupier will have reason to believe that the trespassers will not discover the condition.
Secondly, if the trespasser qualifies as a known trespasser under § 337, then 2 of the conditions
of § 335 must be met, with the additional condition that the possessor know or have reason to
know of the trespasser's presence in dangerous proximity to the condition.
77. 489 P.2d at 314.
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tions on the land than is elsewhere provided for licensees or trespassers,
the landowner is required to exercise reasonable care to discover a

dangerous condition. Therefore, when a dangerous condition is unknown to the landowner but is discoverable by the exercise of reasonable
care, only invitees, and not licensees and trespassers, will be afforded

protection under the Restatement view, 78 with the entrant's status as the
controlling determinant of liability. The respect for the Restatement

manifested by the court's attempted reconciliation of its own decision
with the Restatement position could have been demonstrated more con-

structively by acknowledging that the decision did in fact depart from
the common-law classifications accepted in modified form by the
Restatement. The court in Radovich, however, sought to substantiate

its conclusion by impliedly attributing its own position on the
abrogation of the common-law classes to the Restatement principles of

landowner liability.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF REJECTING THE COMMON-LAW ENTRANT
CLASSES

Certain foreseeable consequences of the decisions in Rowland,
Pickard, and Radovich constitute the most significant and persuasive

justifications for judicial abrogation of the common-law entrant classifications. Implementation of the reasonable conduct standard will eliminate much of the confusion and inconsistency incident to judicial administration of the common-law doctrine. First, the Rowland standard will
relieve the courts of the preliminary and time-consuming determination
of the claimant's status. 79 Secondly, implementation of this standard
will alleviate the particularly inconsistent treatment for claimants who
were similarly situated that attended classification as an invitee or licensee under the common-law scheme.80 For example, one who purchased
a drink in a local tavern and who later injured himself when he fell into
78. In such circumstances §§335, 337, and 342 would not impose liability because these
provisions require that the possessor have knowledge or reason to know of the dangerous condition.
79. See cases cited note 69 supra.
80. Compare Murphy v. Kelly, 15 N.J. 608, 105 A.2d 841 (1954) (child accompanying parent
an invitee as a matter of law); Wingrove v. Home Land Co., 120 W. Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563 (1938)
(guest in automobile at service station an invitee as a matter of law); Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn.
394, 155 A. 502 (1931) (one who enters the premises to use public telephone an invitee as a matter
of law), with Petree v. Davision-Paxon-Stokes Co., 30 Ga. App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923) (child
accompanying parent a licensee as a matter of law); Morse v. Sinclair Auto. Serv. Co., 86 F.2d
298 (5th Cir. 1936) (guest in an automobile at service station a licensee as a matter of law); Argus
v. Michler, 349 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. App. 1961) (one who enters the premises to use public telephone
a licensee as a matter of law).
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a concealed trap was allowed to recover as an invitee,8 but under nearly
identical circumstances, a second individual was denied recovery because a friend bought his drink for him, making the plaintiff a licensee
because he had not conferred pecuniary benefit upon the proprietor. 2
Thirdly, adoption of the Rowland standard will eliminate the multiplication of inconsistencies that results under the common-law class rules
because the status of the entrant is subject to change subsequent to his
entry by reason of conduct by the entrant or the landowner." In one
often-cited English case,8 4 a plaintiff who entered the premises as a
trespasser was later accorded licensee status and, when he transacted
business with the landowner, was classified as an invitee. The standard
of reasonable conduct under the circumstances resolves the problem of
the entrant's status changing while he is on the premises by eliminating
the conclusive significance of the formal classification.
Under the reasonable conduct standard of Rowland and Radovich,
the common-law classifications no longer define the landowner's duty
to entrants as a matter of law; therefore more controversies will progress beyond the pleading stage with fewer cases being disposed of by
summary judgments, nonsuits, and directed verdicts.85 As a result, issues
of landowner liability will be determined according to community standards or ordinary care after juries have fulfilled their fact-determining
function. It is reasonable to project that the new standard will produce
more frequent findings of landowner liability because more cases will
reach the jury for ultimate determination and because meritorious
claims that would have been considered futile under the common-law
classification rules" will be pressed with revived vigor.
Although these projected consequences of the Rowland and
Radovich decisions militate strongly in favor of the abrogation position,
there is no reason to anticipate that a shift to the standard of reasonable
conduct under the circumstances will not produce new and difficult
issues to be resolved. First, the application of the duty of reasonable care
81. Braun v. Vallade, 33 Cal. App. 279, 164 P. 904 (1919).
82. Kneuser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205, 133 P. 989 (1913).
83. See West v. Tan, 322 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1963) (restaurant customer lost status as invitee,
becoming licensee when she was given permission to play piano); Hansen v. Cohen, 203 Ore. 157,
276 P.2d 391 (1954) (plaintiff who started dice game on defendant's parking lot after he got his

car lost his status as an invitee).
84. See Dunster v. Abbott, [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572 (C.A.).
85. The court in Rowland expressed concern that the use of summary judgments had been
excessive under the common-law classes. 69 Cal. 2d at 111,443 P.2d at 563, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
86. Many claims were not pressed by injured entrants because they recognized that recovery
would be denied as a matter of law without reference to the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct. See 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 426, 431 (1969).
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to landowners introduces the question of whether unjustifiable insurance
burdens will be imposed upon landowners. The court in Rowland considered the availability of insurance for landowners as one of the many
factors to be weighed in its decision on the desirability of adopting the
new duty of care and concluded that there was no evidence that the
application of ordinary principles of negligence law to landowner's liability would increase insurance premiums appreciably or affect the prevalence of insurance coverage among landowners. 87 Nevertheless, if the
new standard of reasonable conduct prompts a substantial increase in
the number of lawsuits seeking to impose liability on landowners, it is
probable that actuarial realities will dictate a parallel rise in landowner
insurance premiums." Much of the impact of the incremental increases,
however, would be absorbed by commercial and industrial concerns that
are capable of shifting the increased costs to the public through higher
prices, 8' rather than by private homeowners. Whether the recent increase in suits filed against hosts by social guests is the result of broader
homeowner insurance coverage, as has been asserted," or whether such
suits have themselves prompted wider coverage is not readily ascertainable.' Predicting the impact of the Rowland rule on insurance rates and
coverage is therefore conjectural at best.
Secondly, the shift to the Rowland standard presents the possibility
that collusion between social guests and their hosts will intensify the risk
of fraudulent insurance claims. There is no ground, however, for concluding that this asserted risk will prove any greater than exists under
the common-law scheme for business guests and their commercial hosts.
American governmental institutions are surely resourceful enough to
meet the threat, real or imagined, of fraudulent insurance claims with
fairer and more effective measures than the denial of judicial remedies,
in the face of landowner misconduct, to entrants asserting meritorious
claims.2
87.
88.

69 Cal. 2d at 118, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
As the risk insured against, liability to entrants, is increased, it is not improbable that

actuarial realities will demand that the cost of insuring against the risk increase.
89. Because the private homeowner is unable to funnel the impact of increased insurance
costs to other parties, his demand for insurance is relatively price elastic. In other words, as
insurance premiums rise substantially, the homeowner, having limiting resources at his disposal,
is priced out of the market and must reduce his insurance coverage. On the other hand, the ability
of some commercial and manufacturing businesses to pass on the impact of higher insurance rates

to their customers makes the insurance demand of these concerns relatively price inelastic. As the
rates rise, the business is not forced to reduce its coverage.
90. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 17, § 27.12, at 1479.
91.
92.

See 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 171 (1969).
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 426, 432 (1969).
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Thirdly, while the rule of Rowland and Radovich abrogates the
common-law classifications as conclusive determinants of landowner
duty to entrants, the decisions provide that the entrant's status may have
a bearing on the ultimate question of liability.93 The extent of that
bearing may depend, in part at least, upon the formulation of jury
instructions by the various courts. Under the reasonable conduct standard, the entrant's status is regarded as one of the circumstances that
the jury 'must consider in applying the general standard of duty to the
facts of the controversy.94 A particular court's instructions, by attaching
unusual significance to the circumstances of entry, could disproportionately enhance the importance of common-law entrant status in relation to other relevant circumstances, thereby vitiating the effect of the
general standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. The extent
to which jury instructions may reinstate the common-law classifications
within the new standard of reasonable care represents an important
question affecting the vitality of the Rowland rule that must be resolved
by future litigation.
Lastly, the three decisions that have abrogated the common-law
classifications did not directly address the status of trespassers under the
reasonable conduct standard, since each involved claimants who would
have been licensees under the common-law scheme. Because the exceptions to the common-law rules governing the duty owed to trespassers,
most of which are premised on the foreseeability of harm,95 protect the
trespasser in many situations, judicial resistance to the inclusion of
trespassers within the scope of the Rowland rule can be anticipated.
The exceptions were themselves forged from the strict common-law rule
providing only nominal protection for trespassers and each exception
encountered numerous arguments opposing expanded liability to trespassers.9" Only the distinctions between licensees and invitees were repealed in England; the English decision to retain the common-law trespasser classification would appear to lend substance to arguments in
support of such judicial resistance. Inclusion of trespassers within the
sweep of the Rowland rule, however, does not unduly prejudice the
rights of landowners. The trespasser's entry without license or permission is surely one of the circumstances to be weighed by the jury under
the Rowland standard because it is a major factor delimiting the extent
of the foreseeable risk. The uncertain applicability of the reasonable
93.
94.
95.
96.

69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103; 489 P.2d at 314-15.
Id.
See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text.
See materials cited note 18 supra.
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conduct standard to trespassers is a matter to be resolved before the
scope and import of Rowland and Radovich can be appreciated fully.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The several exceptions to the common-law classes have wrought an
elaborate patchwork of legal classifications and subclassifications" that
provides little basis for uniform interpretation by the various jurisdictions." Proponents of the common-law classes can offer few persuasive
arguments justifying the retention of the unmanageable and often unfair
distinctions. Moreover, the deceptive precision of the common-law
classes that inspires support for their retention as a stable method of
deciding landowner liability99 produces arbitrary and inconsistent0 0 application in borderline cases."' Although arguments are propounded to
the contrary, comprehensive revisions of the common law should not
necessarily require legislative initiative where policy considerations are
sufficiently compelling. The interest of society in affording remedies for
injuries to its members surely warrants judicial modification of the
common-law scheme of entrant classes. Furthermore, because the
common-law classifications and subclassifications were promulgated by
the courts, it is entirely appropriate for the courts to modify or abolish
them.
Commentators'02 and jurists"'3 have perceived a judicial trend

toward wider application of the rule of ordinary care to landowner's
liability. The trend is manifested both by the many exceptions to the
common-law classifications and the three recent decisions abolishing the
classifications as the concusive determinant of liability. While the exceptions represent no more than acknowledgement by the courts of the
97.
98.
99.

See notes 31 & 33 supra and accompanying text.
See cases cited note 80 supra.
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (Burke,

J., dissenting).
100. See notes 79-83 supra.
101. The stability argument is rebutted by one commentator who argues that by determining
liability solely by the application of one legal doctrine "[ilt [is] easy to fall into one of the common
fallacies of legal reasoning, namely, that if liability cannot be established by a certain legal principle
it cannot be established at all." Marsh, supra note 6, at 186.
102. "The tendency of the law, here [in relation to landowner liability] as elsewhere, has been
toward an ever fuller application of the requirement of reasonable care under all the circumstances
." 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 17, § 27.1, at 1432.
103. "In modern times the immunities have rightly, though gradually, been giving way to
the overriding social view that where there is foreseeability of substantial harm landowners, as well
as other members of society, should generally be subjected to a reasonable duty of care to avoid
it." Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 463, 126 A.2d 313, 317 (1955).
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foreseeability of certain risks in closely defined situations, the rule of
Rowland and Radovich is a general standard of ordinary care determined by the foreseeability of the risk in all situations. It is anticipated
that the persuasive policy considerations supporting the abrogation of
the common-law scheme will convince more and more jurisdictions to
loose the ties of stare decisis and opt for the theory underlying the wellaccepted exceptions as logically implemented by the general rule of
Rowland v. Christian.
The United States is no longer the agrarian society that accepted
the scheme of entrant classes from England as adopted common law.
The national character is now dominated by a rapid-paced urban and
suburban culture. The exigencies of this urban civilization have produced a more "gregarious society"' 14 and have increased the probability
that people will enter the property of others. 10 5 Considerations of human
safety within an urban community dictate that the landowner's relative
immunity, which is primarily supported by the values of the agrarian
past, be modified in favor of negligence principles of landowner liability.
104.
105.

See 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 171 (1969).
Id.

